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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000117

SIPDIS

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ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD

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TAGS: [AMGT](#) [ASEC](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [YM](#) [EAC](#) [COUNTER](#) [TERRORISM](#)

SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 01/16/2004

Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and (d).

11. (S/NF) Begin Summary: The Ambassador convened an EAC meeting on January 17, 2005, to review post policy for private or official events at Embassy Officer housing following a recent attempted attack against Embassy personnel at an Employee residence during the Christmas holidays. The COM noted the possibility that the possible assailant might have committed an overt act had his bodyguard team not been at the residence - a team which was beefed up in the past two years with a RSO directed Embassy hired advance and follow team of LES security officers. The Ambassador concluded the discussion with EAC members by directing the RSO to write down a post policy for RSO/COM review and approval involving any event American Embassy related that would result in the clustering of westerners at difficult to defend/soft-target sites i.e. private residences or public restaurants. EAC members noted no additional threats against Embassy Sanaa or Americans in Yemen and discussed make up and execution of the EAC core and expanded meetings. Key offices and personnel represented included: CDA, FPD, OMC, RMAS, POL/ECON ,MO, CCE, DAO, AID, PD, and RSO. END SUMMARY.

12. (S/NF) The Ambassador with the assistance of RMAS, began the discussion with an update regarding details concerning the recent attempt by a man with two fragmentary grenades and a handgun who attempted to scale the wall of an Embassy residence in what may have resulted in an attack against Embassy personnel attending a private Christmas Eve dinner. The RSO briefed EAC members on recent requests to hold representational events at private residences since the incident. RSO further noted with the EAC the difficulty in protecting such residences despite Yemen government officials assurances from a vehicle born improvised explosive device or intrusion by armed assailants.

13. (S/NF) Under the direction of the COM, EAC members reviewed current policies and practices regarding the coordination of such events with the RSO. Finally, based on EAC input, the COM directed the RSO to write down a policy, making the sponsoring of large soft target events the exception rather than the rule for the foreseeable future. EAC provided three categories for the RSO to consider in refining post soft-target events to include: 1. Private Dinner Parties with 15 or fewer invitees; 2. Large Open Parties/Celebrations at residences or public places and 3. Medium to Large Official Functions at private residences or public places. The COM noted that in a critical threat security environment medium to large gatherings that cluster westerners in an undefended or inadequately defended location should not occur. EAC members also noted that all events both private and official must be carefully coordinated with the RSO to ensure perimeter security commensurate with the nature and size of the event and proper access control. Events that leave a footprint and significantly raise a location's threat profile should not occur according to EAC members if the RSO is unable to ensure standoff on the perimeter and proper access control into the event.

14. (S/NF) RMAS provided no new insights into recent threat reporting regarding Yemen. The EAC noted the fact that the British Embassy re-opened Saturday 15 January 2004, but little information regarding why British officials concluded it was safe to re-open was known by EAC members, other than the lack of threat specifics or imminent threat information.

15. (SBU) EAC members also discussed the warden messages to date and considered who should receive distribution of warden messages as well as how to notify unofficial Americans staying in twelve hotels throughout Yemen.

16. (SBU) The DCM prodded EAC members and their staff to take their personal security very seriously and keep the RSO informed about security concerns in light of what appears to be an increase in threat reporting regarding Yemen and the region. The EAC meeting ended with a review by the DCM of the make-up of the Core EAC and recognition that core EAC meetings must be called and reported immediately after threat related incidents or threat related reporting involving

Yemen.

KRAJESKI